

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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THE UNIVERSITY
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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 6 February 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. WINKLER

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. E. MOREIRA HOSANNAH
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. P. WINKLER
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. A. CARRANCO AVILA

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. S. DABROWA

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. I. VIRGIN
Mr. R. BOMAN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV
Mr. V.B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. S. DePALMA
Mr. L.D. WEILER
Mr. C.G. BREAM
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the 362nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. ECOBESCO (Romania) (translation from French): Before taking up the substance of the first statement by the Romanian delegation at this stage of our negotiations, I should like to extend to the new heads of the delegations of Brazil and India, Mr. de Araujo Castro and Mr. Husain, a most hearty welcome to our Committee. It is a pleasure for us to welcome to our midst once again Mr. Gomez Robledo and Mr. Blusztajn, the leaders of the Mexican and the Polish delegations. We are particularly gratified by the recent promotion of Mr. Porter and Mr. DePalma to the rank of Ambassador, and ask them to accept the congratulations of the Romanian delegation. We also welcome the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and the Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Epstein, on whose competent assistance our Committee can always rely.
3. On the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 18 January, the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America submitted a revised text of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/193/Rev.1, 192/Rev.1). At the present stage in our discussions the Romanian delegation would like to ask the sponsors of this text to clarify a number of questions of vital importance to the understanding of the text submitted to us and to elucidation of the many and varied aspects of the treaty on non-proliferation. That is the purpose of the questions which we put today to the sponsors of the draft.
4. First, the discussions which have taken place during the past few years in our Committee, in the United Nations General Assembly, and in other international bodies have brought out very clearly the special importance attached to the question of the security guarantees to be enjoyed by the non-nuclear States as one of the essential elements of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The revised text of the draft treaty contains no provisions concerning security guarantees but the same gap on this subject as in the first text (ENDC/192, 193). Can one imagine that detailed analysis, discussion and negotiation can take place on the draft in the absence of a specific clause concerning guarantees? Is not the

(Mr. Ecobesco, Romania)

requirement fully justified that, until the complete elimination of existing nuclear weapons and consequently until the complete abolition of the nuclear threat, States not possessing nuclear weapons should enjoy greater security guarantees? We should like to know whether the nuclear Powers are prepared to assume a solemn obligation, through the treaty on non-proliferation, never in any circumstances to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing them, nor to threaten these States in any case or in any manner with their use.

5. Secondly, do the nuclear Powers agree that it is essential to place the treaty on non-proliferation in a set of measures designed to lead to cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, prohibition of underground tests for military purposes, and the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of existing stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery? If so, how can one justify the absence from the draft treaty of a firm legal obligation binding the nuclear Powers to undertake specific measures of disarmament and particularly nuclear disarmament? We should also like to know why no provision has been made in the draft for the convening of periodic conferences to consider how the obligations assumed by all parties to the treaty have been fulfilled.

6. Thirdly, we should like to know on what legal footing it is proposed in article X, paragraph 1, that the notice of withdrawal by a State from the treaty "shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests". As we know, the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the Treaty on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)), and the Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (ENDC/186) -- to mention only those international instruments bearing an obvious similarity to the treaty on non-proliferation -- do not contain an obligation of that kind. Does this mean that the body to which a sovereign State will give notice should express comments and opinions on the content and justification of that notice?

7. Fourthly, what is the political, legal and ethical concept underlying the position of the sponsors on control? How does one explain that the draft treaty advocates the application of control solely in relation to the obligations which the

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non-nuclear States would have to assume under article II, whereas in relation to the obligations to be assumed by the nuclear Powers under article I no measure of control is proposed? Could it be acceptable that almost all the States of the world -- generally speaking, the small and medium-sized States -- should be subject to control and that only five countries, namely the nuclear Powers, should not be subject to any control measures? How could such a profoundly discriminatory concept be reconciled with the sovereign equality of States, a cardinal principle of contemporary international relations, to which all the States represented on this Committee have subscribed as members of the United Nations?

8. Fifthly, with particular reference to article I, what guarantee is there that the nuclear Powers will honour their undertakings not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever, and not to assist, encourage or induce other States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons? As we know, in the territories of many non-nuclear States there are nuclear weapons installed at military bases and on launching pads. What guarantee is there that the armed forces of such States, which take part in joint training exercises with the military personnel of the respective nuclear-weapon States in order to learn how to use nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, will not have access to nuclear weapons and will not come into possession of them or acquire control over them?

9. Sixthly, passing on now to article III, we should like to know the exact meaning of the phrase "safeguards system" of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in paragraph 1. Does it mean the present system, or a system which will be continually amplified? In the latter case, what are the reasons for doing so?

10. Seventhly, what is the relationship between the expressions "safeguards system" of the Agency, and "the safeguards required by this Article"?

11. Eighthly, what is meant by the formula "all peaceful nuclear activities"? In that regard, how are we to understand the provision that the safeguards required "by this Article" shall be applied "on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities"?

12. Ninthly, what is the purpose of applying the safeguards to all "source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility"? What is the meaning

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of the words "any principal nuclear facility" for the purposes of article III? Furthermore, what is the purpose of applying safeguards on all source or special fissionable material "outside any such facility"?

13. Tenthly, if the "exclusive purpose" of implementation of the IAEA safeguards is to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as provided in paragraph 1 of article III, why is the application of controls advocated "on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities"?

14. Eleventhly, seeing that under paragraph 1 of article III control will be exercised over all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear States, how would it be possible to carry out the provisions of paragraph 3, which stipulates that the economic and technological development of the Parties to the Treaty must not be hampered? How could such control be reconciled with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States?

15. Twelfthly, for what reasons does paragraph 2 of the same article apply only to deliveries of nuclear material and equipment to non-nuclear States, and why does it not also apply to exports to nuclear countries?

16. Those are the questions formulated by the Romanian delegation and submitted to the attention of the sponsors of the revised draft treaty. We are confident that the clarifications which the co-Chairmen will be so good as to give us will enable us to obtain a more complete picture of the draft treaty submitted for our consideration. There can be no doubt that once the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the body to which the United Nations has entrusted the negotiation of disarmament problems, including the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, is in possession of all the necessary elements, it will be able to undertake a discussion in depth of the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

17. Mr. DePALMA (United States of America): I should like to have an opportunity to study the statement just made by the representative of Romania before I undertake to comment on it. Today I wish to speak on some more general aspects of the treaty.

18. When the complete text of the draft non-proliferation treaty is submitted to the United Nations General Assembly with the report of the Committee on or before 15 March, we shall be moving to the final stage of the consideration of this treaty.

(Mr. DePalma, United States)

19. If we take as the opening phase of the elaboration of the treaty the adoption by the General Assembly on 4 December 1961 of resolution 1665 (XVI), the "Irish resolution" as it came to be called, and if we assume that the treaty will be opened for signature following the resumed session of the General Assembly this spring, we find that the question of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons will have been under international discussion for over seven years. Intensive discussions of actual treaty formulations have been underway since the first draft text was submitted by the United States on 17 August 1965 (ENDC/152).

20. I cite this chronology to underscore two points. The first is that the text now before the Committee is the product of long, complex and intensive negotiation. It is the result of detailed and extensive exchanges of views between the co-Chairmen, within respective alliances, between the members of nuclear alliances and non-nuclear and non-aligned delegations represented at this Conference and with various individual governments not represented here. During these consultations a considerable part of the co-Chairmen's task was not the reconciliation of differences between themselves; it was rather the effort on their part, acting in their function as co-Chairmen, to draft agreed texts which would meet the variety of views expressed by a large number of non-nuclear States, among which were States whose adherence would be particularly important for the success of the treaty.

21. In any serious negotiations it is seldom possible to fix exact schedules or even to predict the point at which matters are likely to come to a head. But in all such negotiations a point is inevitably reached when all concerned recognize that the negotiation has, in fact, reached a decisive stage. I submit that we arrived at that point with the submission of the revised United States and Soviet texts on 18 January (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1). The delegation of the United States for its part is now convinced that this negotiation will succeed in producing a widely-acceptable treaty. It follows, therefore, that we believe we should now concentrate our efforts on the necessary final points which will facilitate its consideration by the General Assembly. It is now also incumbent on all of us to expedite our work so that this treaty may enter into force in time to accomplish its purpose.

22. The second point which emerges from my brief review of the history of this effort is that it was initiated and inspired by a non-nuclear-weapon State on behalf of other non-nuclear-weapon States. The essence of the treaty we are now considering

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was embodied from the very beginning in the Irish resolution and was retained in the various resolutions of the Assembly which followed. It is the desire felt first and foremost by the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States for assurance against the risk, to them, of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This desire is strongly shared by the nuclear-weapon States which have been engaged in this effort; but this project would not have reached this decisive stage had it not accurately reflected the most widely felt needs and desires of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

23. During the past few months we heard a number of thoughtful comments on the draft non-proliferation treaty text then before this Committee (ENDC/192,193). Numerous suggestions for further improvements in the text were made, many of which have been incorporated in the revised texts of 18 January. Many of those suggestions were based on the premise that if, by this treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States are to renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, or control over such weapons, then the nuclear-weapon States should offer some equivalent compensation. It has been stated that this should take the form of a commitment to achieve reductions in existing nuclear arsenals or, at least, to stop their further growth.

24. The United States shares the prevailing view of the importance of provisions in this treaty dealing with a cessation of the nuclear arms race. However, this is not a question of making some compensating sacrifice; we believe it is in our national interest to halt the nuclear arms race and to begin reducing existing nuclear arsenals. Therefore we support the desire of those who wish to see this treaty serve as a catalyst to hasten agreement on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

25. The tendency to view a commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States as a quid pro quo for the renunciation of nuclear weapons by other States fails to take into account the actual intention and situation of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States. As others have already pointed out in this Committee and elsewhere, the vast majority of such States have no intention, desire or indeed any early prospect of producing or acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Moreover, those who look for a quid pro quo seem to consider this treaty as if it were a commercial contract in which each party seeks to trade off concessions in order to gain equal financial or trade benefits. However, the non-proliferation treaty is not that kind of agreement; its primary benefit accrues to all of us directly in the form of enhanced security and not as a result of balanced concessions.

26. Compared with commercial benefits, security gains are more difficult to measure or to put into exact balance. Nevertheless, if there is any inequality in the security benefits accruing to parties to the non-proliferation treaty, it is surely weighted in favour of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It seems quite evident that the primary benefit conferred by this treaty is the assurance it provides, in the first instance, to the non-nuclear-weapon States that their non-nuclear neighbours or rivals will not produce or acquire nuclear weapons. As a result, they will not have to assume the enormous expenditures, and the serious security risk, of acquiring nuclear weapons.

27. That is the essence of this treaty, and if we are to achieve it we must be realistic about provisions relating to further measures of nuclear disarmament. Article VI in the present text serves its essential purpose of providing the desired impetus towards further measures to halt the arms race; but it does so without creating an obstacle to the early conclusion of the treaty.

28. I believe we must be candid in this Committee, which has accumulated so much knowledge and experience in this area. We all know the obstacles that have stood in the way of agreement on various measures proposed to halt the nuclear arms race. We also know that the most helpful action we can now take to curb the nuclear arms race is to expedite the conclusion of this treaty. The early entry into force of this treaty will serve that purpose because, more than any other single action now open to us, it is bound to create a more favourable atmosphere for progress in achieving limitations on nuclear arsenals. Anything which unnecessarily delays or further complicates the conclusion of the treaty will not serve our purpose.

29. I should now like to turn to another aspect of this treaty which, I believe, needs to be emphasized. It is the fact that it will serve as an instrument for promoting peaceful applications of nuclear energy, especially in the less-developed countries. Including as it does a practical and effective provision for safeguards, the treaty will prevent what could otherwise become a major hindrance to the widest possible co-operation in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy in the non-nuclear-weapon countries.

30. We shall soon face the danger of having significant amounts of plutonium scattered throughout the world in the wake of the many nuclear electric power reactors that will be installed in many countries. Bilateral safeguards would not suffice to eliminate suspicions that could arise among third parties; neither

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would the continued voluntary and incomplete acceptance of international safeguards. Because one could never be certain that mounting quantities of plutonium could be accounted for in the future and placed under safeguards, a point would soon be reached when international co-operation in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy could be seriously inhibited. The safeguards which would be established by this treaty would eliminate that hindrance to co-operation.

31. The peaceful uses provisions of the treaty thus underscore the advantages of its safeguards provisions. Such safeguards will facilitate the implementation of what, for the United States, has been an established policy of contributing to the widest possible spread of information and technology on peaceful uses. The time has come to recognize that one of the positive benefits of the treaty is the impetus it will give to co-operation in expanding the peaceful applications of atomic energy.

32. As the representative of Canada reminded us at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.361, para.23), we have a relatively brief period remaining in which to prepare our report to the General Assembly. Speaking for the United States delegation, may I express the hope that further comments on the revised texts will be made as soon as possible and that they will take into account the decisive stage we have now reached?

33. The co-Chairmen have done their best to take into account the interests of all concerned. They have placed before this Committee a text which, they believe, will be effective in halting the threat of nuclear proliferation and which should be widely acceptable. But the draft before us is not, of course, merely the work of the co-Chairmen; all members of this Committee have made contributions to the progressive improvement of that text. As President Johnson stated on the occasion of the presentation of the revised draft treaty on 18 January:

"We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests."

(ENDC/212)

34. The United States delegation, for its part, appreciates the co-operative spirit that has prevailed in this Committee throughout this process. We are sure that the spirit will continue during the remainder of our work at this session, and that when we have achieved this significant step forward it will contribute to the further steps that must be taken to remove the menace of the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy).

35. Mr. CARACCILOLO (Italy) (translation from French): Since the representative of the United States has alluded to the proposal made by Mr. Burns on 1 February in his capacity as Chairman of the meeting, I also should like to express the opinion of the Italian delegation on that subject. The Italian delegation is particularly conscious of the reminder given by Mr. Burns that we must not forget "that the General Assembly has given us a certain job to be done by a certain time" (ENDC/PV.361, para.27). We highly appreciate the idea of laying down a fairly precise procedure for the work of the Committee so as to enable us to comply with the date-limit set by General Assembly resolution 2346 (XXII) (ENDC/210) for the submission of a report on the state of the negotiations and the results achieved by our Conference.

36. In that connexion, allow me to stress once again that the terms of reference in question, which form the basis of our present work and which were laid down before the revised text of the draft treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1) was presented, request our Committee in paragraphs 2 and 3 of their operative part urgently to continue the negotiations on a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted and to the views expressed by member States during the twenty-second session. That, in our opinion, means that in our final report we must inform the General Assembly in a specific manner of the action taken on all the proposals submitted to the Committee, even before the presentation of the new text, in order to avoid re-discussion in the General Assembly of the proposals which have not yet been taken into consideration, which would further delay the speedy conclusion of the treaty, which is our common aim.

37. This also means that, in order to do a good job, it is necessary to begin by drawing up a list of all the proposals submitted and to indicate the reasons why some of them could not be accepted. A working document of that kind would guide us in our discussions, would serve to eliminate the possibility of omissions and, in short, would save us time by leading us towards a thorough examination through the active and collective participation of all delegations. Furthermore, the drafting of such a list would not take us away from the work time-table proposed by Mr. Burns. But permit me to add that I should not like that time-table to be laid down too rigidly and limit the right of all delegations to have the necessary time to complete the conscientious and constructive examination of the new text.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

38. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): I shall say straight away that I do not much like procedural debates, because they are time-consuming and as a rule merely conceal differences of substance. Therefore I believe it is better to deal with the substance than to talk about procedure. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the statement of our Italian colleague deserves our attention and also calls for some comments.
39. If I understand the representative of Italy correctly, he would like the Committee to have before it a document containing all the proposals put forward during the discussion that has taken place on the non-proliferation treaty. It seems to me, however, that a proper procedure should recognize that we have before us a specific text of a draft treaty and that it is the only working document we have before us.
40. Obviously the situation was different during the October session. At that time also we had a draft treaty text (ENDC/192, 193), to which a number of draft amendments were submitted. Since the text which we had before us in the autumn has been withdrawn, I do not think there are now any amendments. Delegations that would like their proposals and suggestions examined should study the new draft treaty to see whether they think it needs to be amended.
41. I wish to say at once that that is not an invitation by the Polish delegation to other representatives to submit amendments. As I have told you, the Polish delegation is prepared to accept the draft treaty submitted by the two co-Chairmen without any change; but I believe that at the present stage in our discussions we cannot speak about the ideas and suggestions put forward by other members of the Committee without recognizing that there is a new draft treaty, to which delegations so desiring may obviously submit amendments. I think that delegations which have such intentions should do so as rapidly as possible. That would certainly facilitate our task enormously.
42. I do not see any possibility of drafting a working document which, as our Italian colleague has suggested, would be a summary of all the proposals, ideas and suggestions put forward during our work.
43. Mr. CARACCILOLO (Italy) (translation from French): The representative of Poland has said he does not like procedural debates. He has, nonetheless, raised a question of procedure by saying that the present revised text cancels all the proposals and amendments submitted previously. That is an interpretation which, I frankly admit, I cannot accept.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

44. The new text, (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1), which we have studied and concerning which we certainly reserve our right to express both our assessment and our comments, is the text presented by the two co-Chairmen. In my statement I wished to recall the terms of reference given to us by the General Assembly. Those terms of reference assign to the whole Committee, collectively, the task of considering all the views expressed during our work by the various delegations.

45. I do not think that the fact that this text has been presented by the two co-Chairmen can prevent the various delegations from discussing all the proposals which they have submitted and which, no doubt for very valid reasons, could not be incorporated in the text. That seems to me to be, not a merely procedural question, but a question of substance. And in that sense I am glad that the representative of Poland has opened a discussion on a matter to which I too attach importance and which is a question of substance.

46. Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I should like to state briefly how much my delegation shares the views and suggestions of the representative of Italy. A procedure such as the one he suggested would certainly help the members of the Committee, permitting us to prepare and collate measures and amendments by enabling us to ascertain the extent to which the suggestions made by different delegations have been met in the revised draft treaty. The adoption of the Italian suggestion would, in our opinion, really contribute to speeding up our proceedings and facilitate the exchange of opinions on the points we are discussing.

47. I should like to emphasize another very important point just mentioned by the representative of Italy, regarding the exact terms of the mandate of the General Assembly. That mandate, as we understand it, falls collectively on all States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

48. Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): I should like to dispel a misunderstanding. The Polish delegation believes that every delegation present in this Committee has the right to submit suggestions, opinions and amendments. But when we speak of amendments, we must bear in mind that amendments can be submitted only to a specific text. Moreover, the amendments that were suggested during the autumn session were submitted with due regard to the draft treaty which was before the Committee (ENDC/192, 193). In my opinion, those amendments in their original form no longer exist, because we have a new text. Delegations that wish to maintain

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the points of view they expressed during the autumn session have only to submit new amendments to the new text. I am not inviting them to do so, but I consider that that would be the proper procedure, and in my opinion the only possible procedure. Otherwise the Secretariat would be required to summarize the discussion that has taken place on the subject of the non-proliferation treaty since 1961. That would indeed be an enormous labour and one that would in no way facilitate our task.

49. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to support the argument put forward by the representative of Poland. As a matter of fact, the situation is that last year the Soviet Union and the United States submitted a draft treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/192, 193). A number of additions, amendments and proposals were put forward concerning the text submitted last summer.

50. In January this year a new text of the draft treaty was submitted (ENDC/192/Rev.1, 193/Rev.1). When this new draft text was presented for the consideration of the Committee, the Soviet side explained all the basic provisions, taking into account all the amendments and additions previously put forward that have been introduced into the new text of the treaty (ENDC/PV:357). Consequently we now have a completely new situation in which we have a new text of the treaty. It now seems to us legally inadmissible to consider additions and amendments to a text which has in fact been withdrawn.

51. A new draft text on non-proliferation has been submitted, and consequently it is possible to talk of considering comments, additions and proposals relating to this text. What sense is there in considering additions and proposals in regard to a text which no longer exists, which has in fact been withdrawn by those who proposed it? We are no longer proposing the text which was submitted in the summer of 1967. Whatever amendments to it there might be, whatever the direction in which they would amend it, we cannot now discuss them, because the text in regard to which they would be put forward no longer exists. I therefore fully associate myself with the entirely appropriate and entirely correct comments and remarks that have been made by the representative of Poland.

52. We also fully support the remark that we are not inviting the submission of amendments; but in any case the amendments and additions of which there can be any question can relate only to the treaty which now exists for the consideration of the Committee. The text submitted last summer no longer exists; we are not calling for its consideration, and I do not think that any representative is proposing this.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

53. Mr. CARACCILO (Italy) (translation from French): Without wishing to retain the attention of the Committee longer on this question, I think that it is rather important. We must try to explain ourselves very clearly in order to avoid any misunderstanding.

54. I must first of all reassure the representative of the Soviet Union. At no time have I proposed resuming the examination of the previous texts, although what is now concerned is not a new text but a revised draft. What I wanted to say -- always basing myself on the very precise terms of reference given us by the General Assembly of the United Nations -- is that in the present revised text not all -- I say advisedly, not all -- the proposals that were made have found a place. Certainly several proposals have been accepted and there have been noticeable improvements; but other proposals have been made which have not been discussed in this Committee.

55. All that I wanted to say and have brought to the attention of the Committee, which, of course, will judge it as a whole, is that we should do well to recall which proposals have not found a place in the revised draft treaty and to know the reasons for this.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 362nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Pavel Winkler, representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United States, Italy, Poland, Brazil and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 February 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.